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Abstract: This paper discusses the ongoing patriotic education campaign in Russia and how school 
practitioners interpret patriotism and patriotic education. Patriotism is interpreted in Russia through 
terms that span the whole political and ideological spectrum from almost extreme left to extreme right, 
accurately reflecting the existing dichotomy deeply entrenched in Russian culture and mentality. In this 
study, more than 300 of Russia’s teachers participated in a survey about the elements of patriotic 
education (return rate – 77%). The author argues that despite a strong tendency to rationalize 
patriotism in political and educational discourses through traditionalistic and militaristic frameworks, 
teachers’ opinions about patriotism and patriotic education are more nuanced and pragmatic. 






On the very last full working day of 2015, December 30, the Russian Government endorsed a new 
State Program of Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation, 2016-2020 
(Gosudarstvennaya Programma, 2015). This program was the latest in the series of four consecutive 
state-sponsored programs of patriotic education.  The term patriotic education requires special 
explanation, particularly for readers outside China or the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Unlike 
education for patriotism or teaching patriotism, terms that are more familiar to educators in the U.S. 
and Western Europe, patriotic education is a much broader term that encompasses a system of 
centralized government-approved and sponsored activities aimed at instilling patriotic sentiments for 
the purpose of mobilizing the population to support official policies (Sperling, 2003). As such, the term 
is generally used in countries with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments, weak civil 
society, and centralized systems of education. In schools and other educational institutions, patriotic 
education is used as one of the major approaches to civic education (Lutovinov, 2006; Piattoeva, 
2005). In many cases, it also determines the content of civic education. 
 
A specific role of patriotism-related topics and an increasing emphasis on patriotic sentiments in 
educational and other discourses in Russia have been observed since the late 1990s. These tendencies 
became particularly distinct in 2001, when the first state program of patriotic education was adopted, 
to be followed by a number of other state-sponsored federal programs aimed at stirring up patriotic 
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sentiments and loyalty among Russia’s population, particularly youths (Bloom 2006; Golunov, 2012; 
Rapoport, 2015). The official purpose of the first program, Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the 
Russian Federation for 2001-2005 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma, 2001), was “to develop the system 
of patriotic education of the citizens of the Russian Federation, that will develop patriotic sentiments 
and consciousness and will be capable of finding solutions to consolidate the society, maintaining 
societal and economic stability, and reinforcing unity and friendship among peoples of the Russian 
Federation” (p. 1). That program was soon followed by a new conception of patriotic education in 
2003 (Kontseptsiya, 2003). The second state program for the years 2006-2010 (Gosudarstvennaya 
Programma, 2005) was aimed at providing a smooth transition from the initial program to a newer 
version, and adjustments of the patriotic education campaign to new conditions in Russia. Together 
with numerous local educational programs in Russia’s regions, this campaign presented one of the 
most intensive patriotic education campaigns in Russian history. The third similar program was 
launched in 2011 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma, 2010). The preamble to the 930-word document 
stated that it was a continuation of the previous state programs of patriotic education from 2001-
2005 and 2006-2010, and thus “preserves the continuity in the process of the development of patriotic 
consciousness of Russian citizens as a factor of the nation’s unity” (p. 1). The reference to national 
unity in the text was particularly important: It clearly alluded to the main rationale of the campaign, 
namely the development of new identity and unification of the nation.  
 
The intensification of the patriotic education campaign in Russia is explained by several reasons. 
Valerie Sperling (2003) contended that in a system where democratic institutions are weak and the 
attempts to develop civil society are suppressed by the state, government uses discourses of blind 
patriotism “to bring the population together in a common bond of support for the current regime” (p. 
236).  Another reason for the campaign is the concern that fewer and fewer young men have 
expressed their interest to serve in the military (Muckle, 2003; Sperling, 2009). This obviously 
heightened official attention to patriotic education, starkly contrasting with the more liberal model of 
civic education in the 1990s. Observers noted that the educational reform of the early 1990s, which 
was meant to humanize, democratize, and decentralize schools in Russia, drastically changed its 
direction (Ioffe, 2006), and the new model aimed at the  promotion and restoration of some Soviet 
features, including “centralized control, curricular rigidity and political-ideological functions” (Karpov 
& Lisovskaya, 2005, p. 23). They argued that restoration of military education and a focus on patriotic 
education were vivid signs of stylistic re-Sovietization. 
 
Challenges to Civic and Citizenship Education 
 
A curriculum reform that started in the Russian Federation in the early 1990s has been influenced by 
two major challenges. With the reemergence of an independent Russia, an ideologically and politically 
new state appeared and distanced itself from the former Soviet Union by positioning itself as a new 
republic adherent to democratic development. Nation building and identity construction were among 
major governmental political concerns. Thus, the nation building rationale dictated the context, 
conditions, and priorities of education reforms launched immediately after 1991, particularly a reform 
in civic education (Piattoeva, 2005; Rapoport, 2011; Tolz, 1998). 
 
The second challenge that the Russian Federation faced was globalization, which deeply influenced 
school reform development. Debates about globalization, curriculum, and pedagogy revealed the 
centrality of properly negotiated terms and meanings, as well as the importance of culture, both 
political and imaginary-traditional, or the lack thereof, in the understanding of citizenship. The most 
Journal of International Social Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016, 109-124. 
Corresponding author email: rapoport@purdue.edu 
©2012/2018 International Assembly Journal of International Social Studies  
Website: http://www.iajiss.org ISSN:  2327-3585 
  P a g e  | 111 
 
challenging curricular task in this new environment was to develop the ability to deconstruct 
previously unquestioned assumptions (Smith, 2003) in order to reconstruct and eventually 
renegotiate newly contextualized meanings.  
 
During its short post-Soviet history since 1991, Russia witnessed two competing curricular models, 
namely liberal and traditional, which followed one another and mirrored two distinct social and 
economic developmental models during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 
21st century. Both models were Russia’s response to the two aforementioned major challenges: 
construction of the new identity and globalization. The choices were highly reflective and 
demonstrative of the type of citizens that the ruling elite intended to educate. The changes in civic 
education in the last decade seem to have been determined by ideological intents. Thus, civic 
education, which is particularly susceptible to even miniscule shifts in ideological and political 
paradigms, found itself at the very intersection of the organic needs of society and individual political 
ambitions. 
 
Very few aspects of civic education have drawn as much attention from government officials and 
practical educators as patriotic education. Immense global processes that have occurred since the end 
of World War II, including societal and economic changes in the last 50-60 years, emerging new 
countries and the disintegration of former empires, and rapidly evolving new democracies confronted 
with much slower developing civil societies have resulted in inevitable tensions between the 
rationalization and comprehension of citizenship and the level of social and national cohesion. Thus 
questions about patriotism have come to the forefront of debates in political, cultural, and educational 
discourses.  
 
Development of Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia 
 
Although patriotism means many things to many people, it is generally defined as a special affinity 
one feels toward one’s country, a “sense of positive identification with and feelings of affective 
attachment to one’s country” (Schatz, Staub, & Levine, 1999, p. 152).  Despite the expanding 
theoretical substantiation of the need to shift popular allegiances to the rule of law and constitution 
rather than to an individual country (Habermas, 2001; Nussbaum, 1994), the majority of scholars 
correlate the paradigm of patriotic discourses with an individual country or locality. However, patriotic 
sentiments are seen differently by different people. On the one hand, patriotism denotes loyalty to 
the nation and a pride for the nation’s culture and achievements (Finn, 2007; Fonte, 1997; Lutovinov, 
2006; Ravitch, 2006). On the other hand, patriotic discourses are becoming more inclusive, and their 
materials more often question subjects and objects of national pride and critically revise and 
reevaluate national histories and myths (Apple, 2002; Gomberg, 1990; Merry, 2009; Nash, 2005; 
Nussbaum, 1994). Observers rationalize these variations by applying different terms: pseudo-
patriotism vs. genuine patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), loyal 
patriotism vs. critical patriotism (Merry, 2009), and blind patriotism vs. constructive patriotism (Staub, 
1997).  
 
Ontologically, patriotism is a social construct that gradually developed as a result of human cultural 
activity. In order to become an institutionalized concept, or in other words to be easily recognizable 
and ubiquitously acceptable, patriotism had to pass three important stages: habitualization, 
objectivation, and legitimation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). An objectivized social construct and the 
society that created it are in a dialectical relationship: the society impacts the development of the 
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construct, and the construct impacts the society. Eventually, the construct becomes internalized; in 
other words, people begin to believe in the reality that they themselves created. The last step in the 
institutionalization is the need to explain and justify the existence of the construct, to legitimize it. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) argued that legitimization is needed to protect already-constructed 
reality so that it would be difficult to reverse the process. 
 
Patriotism is interpreted in Russia through terms that span the whole political and ideological 
spectrum, from almost extreme left to extreme right, accurately reflecting the existing dichotomy 
deeply entrenched in Russian culture and mentality (Arkhipenkova, 2004). This dichotomy of loyal or 
blind patriotism, vs. critical or constructive patriotism, has been present in Russian political and 
educational thought since the time of early Russian Enlightenment. It is reflective of the two main 
philosophical and cultural traditions, namely progressivism and traditionalism, which have 
determined Russia’s policies for almost three centuries. However, it should be noted that for the last 
15 years, the position of loyal or blind patriotism has dominated political, cultural, and educational 
discourses in Russia. The official patriotic education campaign that started in 2001 is the best example 
of this dominance. The sheer number of federal and local programs of patriotic education is evidence 
of the seriousness of official attempts to use broadly the framework of patriotic education in civic 
instruction and for the purposes of national mobilization. 
 
The official institutionalized approach to patriotism and patriotic education is best presented in the 
Conception of Patriotic Education of the Citizens of Russian Federation, adopted by the government in 
2003 (Kontseptsiya, 2003). The document, which claims to “reflect the whole complex of officially 
acknowledged ideas” (p. 2) about patriotic education, unequivocally defines patriotism as “love for 
one’s Motherland, commitment to one’s Fatherland, strong desire to serve its interests, and readiness 
to defend it, even if it requires self-sacrifice” (p. 2). According to the Concept, patriotism is a specific 
type of self-realization and social behavior of citizens determined by the protection of the unity and 
sovereignty of Russia, its national security, stable development, duty, and responsibility. By the latter, 
the authors mean the priority of public and state interests over individual and personal interests. The 
specific features of patriotism in Russia identified by the Conception – togetherness, integrality, 
obedience to the laws, the need of collectiveness – remarkably resonate with the basic principles of 
the famous Russian triad of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality, which constituted the quintessence of 
the policy of State Patriotism in the second quarter of the 19th century during the reign of Nicolas I. In 
general, the emphasis on the overall subordination to state interests at the expense of individual 
interests is central to the concept of patriotism as well as the idea of patriotic education, which is 
interpreted as a “set of systematic and goal-oriented activities of state bodies and institutions as well 
as public organizations aimed at forming and inculcating in citizens heightened patriotic 
consciousness…, readiness to carry out one’s civic duty, and constitutional obligations to defend the 
interests of the Motherland” (p. 4). The document specifically accentuates a military component in 
patriotic education, declaring military education an inseparable part of patriotic education. It is 
symptomatic that the Concept, which is presented as a traditionalist type of narrative that internalizes 
uncritical loyalty to the nation and the state, still twice mentions civil society as one of the 
beneficiaries of proper patriotic education outcomes. Although the text does not clarify how the 
development of civil society can benefit from a hyper-centralized and ideologically conservative 
system of patriotic education, the very reference to it was at the time indicative of possible shifts, 
however insignificant they might have been, in the rationale of value-related education among the 
traditionalists in Russia.  
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The four consecutive five-year state programs of patriotic education passed by the Russian 
government in 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2015 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma 2001; Gosudarstvennaya 
Programma, 2005; Gosudarstvennaya Programma, 2010; Gosudarstvennaya Programma, 2015) are 
based on the ideas and goals set in the Conception of Patriotic Education of 2003. Although symbolic 
in nature (the state-funded portions of each five-year program’s budget is about $20-22 million), the 
programs are eloquent in categorizing and pointing out the directions of ideological development in 
Russia in general and patriotic education in particular. Claiming that the ultimate goal of patriotic 
education is the revival of Russia’s greatness and prominence, the programs recommend state 
activities that would enhance patriotic education, including such elements as an increase of the 
military component in all areas of education, more careful attention to history textbooks, influence 
on electronic and printed media, and assuming more control over children’s organizations.  
 
The most conspicuous feature of the contemporary patriotic education campaign is probably its 
military spirit. The word military is used only three times in the text of the program of 2006-2010, but 
in the most recent program of 2016-2020, military is used 34 times. (Both texts are similar in length.) 
Nonetheless, whether the word military is formally mentioned or not, the term patriotic education 
itself is a code phrase that implies military education, military training, and military preparation. Thus, 
it is not at all surprising that almost all materials about patriotic education, or the implementation of 
each new program, include information about the military or examples of military training. By 2006, 
there were 1,350 youth military clubs with membership of 300,000 or more; the Russian military 
established cooperation with 1,130 military-patriotic clubs and organization;, and there were 452 
summer military camps in all regions of Russia (Surzhko, 2006). The 2016-2020 program reported that 
by 2015, there were 2,000 summer military camps and 22,000 youth military clubs and centers; almost 
22% of Russia’s youth participated in regional and local patriotic education programs.  
 
The list of examples of militarization of consciousness is long and almost emulates, stylistically and 
operationally, activities and programs from the patriotic education curricula from Soviet times (Sredin, 
1988; Vyrshchikov, 1990). This striking resemblance to Soviet curricula explains why many in Russia 
see patriotic education as a rationale with a dominating military agenda. The term that was commonly 
used in the Soviet Union for patriotic education was military-patriotic education. Interestingly, this 
term was never used in the second program of 2006-2010, but it appears 13 times in the 2016-2020 
program. The military rationale of the patriotic education campaign does not need to be explicitly 
explained or clarified: the mutually shared codes patriotism or patriotic education are normally 
“correctly” decoded by educators. The centuries-long tradition of military/patriotic symbiotic unity 
also explains the fact that almost 75% of respondents related patriotic education to military games or 
military clubs and camps (VTsIOM, 2007). 
 
How effective is the patriotic education campaign? It is not surprising that the attention to patriotism 
and patriotic education resulted in more research and more empirical evidence of attitudes and 
perceptions held by various groups in Russia’s population regarding concepts within the patriotism 
paradigm. Mainstream political, sociological, and educational journals focus on such traditional 
aspects of patriotism, such as love for one’s Fatherland, pride in one’s Fatherland, devotion – 
sometimes sacred – to one’s Fatherland, and commitment to serve its interests (Bykov, 2006a, 2006b; 
Ivanova, 2003; Lutovinov, 2006; Mikryukov, 2007; Pulyaev & Shelyagin, 2001). Patriotism is a 
traditional Russian moral value that is instilled in the patriotic idea of “a spiritual unity of a person and 
the Russian society,” contended Pulyayev and Shelyagin (2001, p. 71), who specifically pointed at the 
incompatibility of patriotism and nationalism or cosmopolitanism. Ivanova (2003) developed a 
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typological paradigm of patriotism based on the moral function of the latter. The author argued that 
state patriotism is “an expression of subjects’ pride of the Fatherland, their active participation in 
consolidation and strengthening the state and statehood for the purpose of efficient functioning of 
social institutions, development of the society and individuals” (p. 295). Analyzing relations between 
patriotism and citizenship in the framework of civic-patriotic education, Lutovinov (2006) asserted 
that compared to vague, blurred, and badly defined concepts of citizenship, patriotism is a clear and 
theoretically better developed construct that represents a unity of spirituality, civic maturity, and 
social activity, qualities which motivate a person to serve their Fatherland. Therefore, patriotism, not 
citizenship, should be a leading component of civic-patriotic education because “overestimation of 
citizenship that assumes depatriotization of education of citizens, is a deformation unacceptable for 
the state, society as well as for the individual whose ultimate predestination is to serve their 
Fatherland” (p. 54).  
 
It should be noted that there is also literature in Russia that aims to address various aspects of 
patriotism from a critical-analytical standpoint. In an article with a self-explanatory title, The 
problematic character of patriotism as a value of contemporary Russian culture, Bolshakov (2004) 
argued that those who were mostly worried about the lack of patriotism in Russia were people of the 
older generation. They were disappointed in what they saw around them. Patriotism for them was 
the embodiment of the lifestyle that they were used to; therefore, they constantly called for a revival 
of patriotism. Obviously, the patriotism they wanted to revitalize was Soviet, imperial-state 
patriotism. Grigoryev (2005), in his attempt to determine the real meaning of pride in one’s nation, 
called for more debates and deliberations in patriotic education. Galkin (2005) argued that although 
patriotism and fascism are considered opposing concepts semantically, they are both socio-
psychological phenomena with more similarities than differences. A detailed analysis of patriotic 
education is presented in Golunov’s Patriotic Education in Russia: Cons and Pros (2012), in which the 
author argued that one could trace certain questionable and dangerous tendencies in Russia’s 
patriotic-educational discourse, namely failure to focus on teaching honesty and integrity, lack of 
resistance towards aggressive nationalism and intolerance, and latent support for the “official history” 
policy (p. 271). Although both critical and traditionalist positions on patriotism are presented in 
Russian journals and media, the traditionalist position is much more obtrusive and much more often 
presented in official Russian literature.   
 
The results of empirical studies (Milyukova & Vinokurova, 2007; Ovchinnikova & Ulianova, 2010; 
Sinyagina, 2011; Sperling, 2009; Tsylev & Mulina, 2010) and opinion polls (Levada, 2015) demonstrate 
a certain tension between the perceived and expected goals of the patriotic education campaign and 
its actual intermediate or final outcomes. The studies about aspects of patriotic education conducted 
in various regions of Russia demonstrate contradictory numbers that are interpreted with caution by 
researchers. In Karelia, 78% of high school graduates understand patriotism as a responsibility for the 
Fatherland, 68% are ready to defend their Fatherland, and 81% are proud to be Russian citizens. At 
the same time, only 58% of the respondents called themselves patriots (Milyukova & Vinokurova, 
2007). Very similar results are found in the study conducted in the Khabarovsk region: 72% of the 
respondents believe that patriots are those who love and respect their Motherland and actively 
participate in state affairs, and 86% are proud to be citizens of the Russian Federation; however, only 
55% consider themselves patriots (Bykov, 2010). A survey conducted among 148 high school students 
in the rural area of Arkhangelsk oblast (Ovchinnikova & Ulyanova, 2010) demonstrated that the 
respondents’ idea of patriotism is fragmentary. Only one third linked patriotism to practical action. 
Although 67% related patriotism to certain moral feelings, such aspects as civic responsibility, civic 
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duties, and national dignity were left out. Of those surveyed, 46% said they either doubt whether they 
are patriots or do not consider themselves patriots at all (p. 77). In the Murmansk study of 775 
participants aged 15 to 29, 70% said they were patriots, 23.3% said they lacked feelings of patriotism, 
and 6.4% could not answer the question (Tsylev & Mulina, 2010).  
 
One number must be particularly disappointing for the organizers and conductors of the patriotic 
education campaign: The majority of polls conducted in different years and in different locations 
demonstrate that 45-55% of the surveyed young people would like to leave Russia after graduating 
from college (Bykov, 2010; Milyukova & Vinokurova, 2007; Sinyagina, 2011; Sperling, 2009). Of those 
who want to leave, 65% explain their choice by pointing at a “better life abroad … and better 
opportunities for self-realization” (Sinyagina, 2011, p. 24).  The high percentage of those who would 
prefer to leave Russia permanently, or even temporarily, is particularly discouraging because it is one 
of the most sensitive issues of the Russian mentality: Real patriots cannot live outside Russia – only 
traitors leave their countries (Sanina, 2011). Ostensibly, the allegation of non-patriotism of all those 
who left the country for whatever reason is a characteristic of many traditionalistic, highly centralized 
societies. That was also one of postulates of both propaganda and domestic policy in the Soviet Union 
since the late 1920s. Decreasing the level of emigration was also among the goals of the Patriotism 
programs. 
 
Considering the importance of formal education in children’s socialization and the development of 
civic competences, this study investigated what classroom teachers think about patriotic education. 
The purpose of this study was, on the one hand, to determine how patriotism and patriotic education 
are interpreted and rationalized in official programmatic texts that aim at a proper institutionalization 
of patriotic education, and, on the other hand, how practical educators interpret patriotism and 
patriotic education. I argue that despite a strong tendency to interpret patriotism in political and 
educational discourses through traditionalistic and militaristic frameworks, teachers’ opinions about 





An 11-item questionnaire with multiple choice questions and descriptive evaluative items regarding 
aspects of citizenship and patriotic education was administered in 2013 to participants of several 
teacher professional development workshops (N=304, n=238) who came from 14 regions of Russia. 
All respondents (return rate = 77%) were in-service teachers or building administrators, with 2 to 38 
years of work experience in education. Eleven respondents (almost 5%) identified themselves as 
building administrators (director shkoly, zavuch); 136 respondents (57%) identified themselves as 
subject teachers; and 91 respondents (38%) identified themselves as subject teachers with  additional 
administrative or teaching responsibilities such as subject area department head (predsedatel’ 
metodicheskogo ob’edineniya), teaching methods specialist (metodist), after-school study group 
teacher (uchitel’ gruppy prodlyonnogo dnya), or librarian. The numerical data of the survey were 
processed to find the measures of central tendency and frequency distribution. The processed data 
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I know what patriotic education entails 
YES Rather YES than 
NO 
Rather NO than 
YES 
NO 
> 30 y. o./32 38% 62% - - 
31-40 y. o./66 64% 29% 7% - 
41-50 y. o./90 78% 22% - - 
< 50 y. o./48 71% 25% 4% - 






Table 2. How important are the following components of patriotic education? 
 >30 y. o. /30 30-40 y. o./66 41-50 y. o./90 <50 y. o./46 Total 232/ % 
How important is teaching/inculcating love for the place where one lives? 
Very important 93% 82% 80% 87% 84% 
Important 7% 18% 20% 13% 16% 
Not important - - - - - 
How important is teaching/inculcating love for one’s nation/country? 
Very important 93% 91% 84% 83% 87% 
Important 7% 9% 16% 17% 13% 
Not important - - - - - 
How important is teaching/inculcating love for one’s state? 
Very important 53% 55% 40% 33% 44% 
Important 33% 36% 51% 34% 42% 
Not important 14% 9% 9% 33% 14% 
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How important is teaching/inculcating pride in one’s nation/country? 
Very important 80% 67% 73% 70% 72% 
Important 20% 28% 24% 22% 24% 
Not important - 5% 3% 8% 4% 
How important is teaching a critical attitude to one’s nation/country? 
Very important 20% 12% 16% 15% 16% 
Important 53% 76% 58% 53% 60% 
Not important 27% 12% 26% 32% 24% 
How important is teaching a critical attitude to one’s state? 
Very important 20% 9% 18% 24% 18% 
Important 67% 79% 58% 66% 67% 
Not important 13% 12% 24% 10% 15% 
How important is military training for patriotic education? 
Very important 7% 12% 14% 23% 14% 
Important 53% 45% 51% 44% 48% 
Not important 40% 43% 35% 33% 38% 
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Table 3. Are you satisfied with patriotic education in: 
 >30 y. o./32 31-40 y. o./66 41-50 y. o./90 <50 y. o. /48 Total 236 
Family 
Satisfied 44% 27% 31% 13% 28% 
Not satisfied 56% 60% 47% 67% 56% 
Do not know - 13% 22% 20% 16% 
School 
Satisfied 50% 45% 44% 20% 41% 
Not satisfied  38% 39% 40% 67% 45% 
Do not know 12% 16% 16% 13% 14% 
Extracurricular educational institutions/clubs 
Satisfied 18% 33% 29% 13% 25% 
Not satisfied 38% 45% 31% 58% 42% 
Do not know 44% 22% 40% 29% 33% 
Mass media 
Satisfied 31% 9% 11% 8% 13% 
Not satisfied  69% 81% 80% 88% 81% 




Almost all participants of the survey were generally confident that they know what patriotic education 
entails. However, the degree of confidence was visibly lower among teachers younger than 30 years 
old. This may be a result of two phenomena: First, these teachers belong to the generation that went 
to colleges and universities in the middle and late 1990s, at the time of painful but healthful 
reevaluation of the authoritarian past; second, this generation is probably the first to be directly 
impacted by globalization, which has generated new discourses and has provided new multiple 
perspectives.  
 
The majority of participants of all age groups believe that within the framework of patriotic education, 
it is either important or very important to instill love for the place where one lives and for one’s nation. 
Although the percentage of those who believe that teaching love for one’s nation/country is very 
important, similar to the percentage of those who believe that teaching love for the place where one 
lives (the Russian term “little Motherland”) is also very important, it is interesting that many 
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participants tried to explain in their comments why it is important to teach about  “little Motherland.” 
Normally, the focus of the general patriotic narrative in media, educational, or political discourses is 
an abstract love or affinity for the country. It seems that, per additional comments, the participants 
tried to demonstrate their personal approach to the topic and thus distance themselves from the well-
orchestrated general narrative.  
 
Almost a quarter of the surveyed teachers believe that it is not important to teach children to look 
critically at one’s nation, and more than half believe that it is important but they are not confident 
about it. In the same vein, over 80% of respondents considered love for the state an important or very 
important component of patriotic education. It is essential to keep in mind that state is conceptually 
very closely linked to government. These data can be interpreted twofold. On the one hand, the 
number of teachers who reject the critical perspective as an aspect of patriotic education demonstrate 
that patriotism is still interpreted mostly through its traditionalistic framework. On the other hand, 
the number of teachers who think that students should be taught to form critical opinions about their 
nation or state is much higher than the average number of people in Russia (12%) who think that it is 
patriotic to criticize the shortcomings of their own country (VTsIOM, 2006). It is also important that 
unlike, say, personal patriotism, the idea of state patriotism has dominated patriotic narratives in 
practically all public discourses for decades, if not centuries. First appearing as a reaction to the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars in Europe (Yanov, 1999), the concept of state patriotism outlived 
both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and it is successfully promoted in contemporary Russia. 
For example, Ivanova (2003) argued that among all types of patriotism, state patriotism plays the most 
important consolidating role in society because it manifests the individual’s “active participation in 
consolidation and strengthening the state and statehood” (p. 295). 
 
A stunning 86% of the surveyed teachers do not believe that military training is a very important part 
of patriotic education, including more than a third that believe that military training is not a part of 
patriotic education at all. The data call into question official efforts that heavily rely on a military 
component in promoting a traditionalistic type of patriotism in Russia. These numbers are particularly 
intriguing considering the specific militaristic focus of the latest state program of patriotic education, 
in which patriotic education is both semantically and contextually synonymous with military training 
(Gosudarstvennaya programma, 2016). Another important component is the distribution of choices 
among age groups. Only 7% of teachers under 30 considered that military training is a very important 
aspect of patriotic education, compared to 22% of those over 50.  
 
Another interesting and unexpected result is the participants’ dissatisfaction with the role of the 
media. Eighty-one percent of participants said that they were not satisfied with the role of the media 
in patriotic education, compared with only 13% who were satisfied. The number of the unsatisfied is 
even higher among veteran teachers who are over 50 years old. Traditionally, the media are blamed 
for problems in all societies, and it would not be surprising to observe some criticism of the media in 
this survey. However, two factors make this result intriguing, namely the number of the unsatisfied 
among participants and the fact that the object of severe criticism is the media, which is 
overwhelmingly either run or sponsored by the state and is usually accused of unbalanced 
representations of opinions in the society. 
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Limitations of the Study 
 
At various stages in this study, I encountered limitations that could potentially affect its reliability and 
validity. First, I had to utilize a convenience sampling procedure rather than random sampling, due to 
limited time and resources. Convenience sampling prevented me from collecting data from a broader 
and more diverse range of informants.  
 
Second, the locations and conditions of data collection determined the categories of educators that 
were surveyed. Traditionally, teacher conferences and professional development workshops that 
require long distance travel are attended by educators who were specifically selected by school 
administrators and coould afford such travel. This explains a high percentage of administrators among 
workshop attendees.  
 
Finally, my own background and active involvement in international programs could make me 
unintentionally biased regarding the content of the questionnaire, the construction of questions, and 




Since the inception of the first state program in 2001, the patriotic education campaign in Russia has 
become one of the defining factors in education, particularly in civic education. As evidenced from 
policy documents and representations of the campaign in the Russian media, the three major 
rationales of the campaign are: control of the discourse, national unification along with mass 
mobilization, and the militarization of society. With the demise of Communist ideas and pseudo-
Communist reality, and in the situation of the emergence of a new state, any new ideological paradigm 
offered by the new national elites should include some form of nationalism and patriotism. Patriotic 
education as a particular form of cultural hegemony has been and continues to be a concentration of 
very specific codes and symbols. For decades, Russia’s population has developed a certain pragmatic 
competence and awareness that help to decode and deconstruct all types of narratives related to 
patriotic education and to elicit meanings that adequately correlate with the intents of all agencies 
involved in the development of official patriotic education campaigns. These competences are the 
result of the long experience obtained in the time of the reign of Soviet ideology and phraseology. In 
this situation, teachers and other education practitioners have become a critical element of the 
system – they mediate and interpret meanings and help students, as well as other agents of education, 
to decode symbolic discourses. Due to this role of mediator, gatekeeper, interpreter, and decoder, a 
teacher has a special place in the society, particularly in a hierarchical semi-authoritarian society.  
 
This study demonstrated that the participants understand their roles as mediators and facilitators in 
the development of students’ civic competences. Despite an overwhelming and persistent pressure 
of a traditionalistic approach to patriotism in all dominant discourses, many participants questioned 
such an interpretation and offered a more critical approach. Although the majority of responses were 
consistent with themes of the patriotic education campaign, such as the family’s or school’s 
responsibility for children’s patriotic education, some responses were reflective of an existing 
resistance among educators to the militaristic rationale of the patriotic education campaign or the 
role of the media.   
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